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PREFACE 
ne percent of our common GDP? 1.05%? 0.95%? Once again, the 
member states are locked in an unrelenting and sterile battle about the 
size of the EU budget. 
They are barking up the wrong tree. The amount is not decisive. 
When it comes to EU spending, quality matters far more than quantity. 
And it is on the quality side that we can make the most significant 
improvements. 
The weaknesses of the Union have been brutally revealed by the 
financial crisis. Within a few months, Europe has lost assets considerably 
exceeding the costs for the EU budget over a full seven-year cycle. In spite 
of its unquestionable achievements over the last few decades, the ground is 
shaking under the entire European project. 
The four freedoms and a host of accompanying regulations and 
practices have set the scene for unprecedented economic and social 
development in Europe. The historical cleavages of the continent are being 
overcome through the accession of the new member states and evolving 
relations with the new neighbours. Centuries of parochialism are at last 
giving way to widening horizons. 
The Task Force set out to examine how the next multi-annual 
financial framework of the EU could become more growth-oriented. We 
found this to be entirely in line with the expressed intentions of the 
European Commission, but less so with its actual proposals. 
In the course of our inquiries and deliberations, we noted that the 
role of the EU budget in stimulating growth is principally indirect. Some 
investments in infrastructure, research and innovation promise lasting 
returns, but many expenditures have only short-term and transient effects. 
Such success indicators as ‘jobs created’ or ‘jobs maintained’ testify to a 
myopic vision in several areas of EU policy.  
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For enduring results, we should identify investments with a long-
term impact and a clear European dimension. The strongest generators of 
economic expansion are probably found in the regulatory sphere. 
Important engines for this development are the internal market, the 
monetary union and the growing mobility of skills and knowledge.  
In stimulating lasting growth, EU rules matter more than EU 
expenditures. But the budget has an important role in promoting the many 
processes needed to secure this positive influence. Institutional support is 
crucial for future success. A knowledge-based economy needs knowledge-
based governance. The elaboration, implementation and refinement of the 
regulatory framework require considerable investment in policy analysis, 
policy evaluation and policy learning.  
 
Daniel Tarschys 
Chairman of the CEPS Task Force 
Professor Emeritus in Political Science and Public Administration 
Stockholm University and Chairman of the Board of the  
Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
istorically, large parts of the EU budget have been devoted to 
redistributive measures purporting to build and sustain support 
for European integration. With the challenges now facing the 
European Union, more weight must be given to allocative efficiency and 
investments in European common goods. This report describes how the 
budget could be adapted to promote long-term growth and identifies the 
expenditures that are most conducive to this end. These are in particular 
expenditures that develop the single market and support research and 
innovation.  
The European Commission recently unveiled its proposals for the 
next multi-annual financial framework (MFF) for the period 2014 to 2020. 
The proposals do not radically change the structure of the EU budget, but 
make a serious attempt to improve the quality of strategic planning and the 
implementation of the policies, aligning the expenditures with the Europe 
2020 objectives. The documents have been released at a delicate moment at 
one of the worst points of the financial crisis, which has induced severe 
austerity measures across the EU to cut budget deficits. 
The Commission’s Communication skilfully balances the need to 
address new and pressing EU objectives and the demands for funding 
increases with a freeze in expenditures.1 The document seems to square the 
circle of limiting expenditure to 2013 levels while increasing it, at least 
theoretically, to the levels sought by the European Parliament if one 
combines the provisions for special budgetary lines now outside the MFF.  
                                                      
1 European Commission, Communication on a Budget for Europe 2020, COM(2011) 
500 final, Part I, Brussels, 29 June 2011(a). 
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Presentational skills, however, are not what Europe needs from the 
EU budget, but rather a real overhaul of how it is managed and what the 
expenditures are used for. The EU budget has substantial untapped and 
poorly understood potential as a long-term investment tool at the European 
level. The proposals do show important steps forward, demonstrating the 
Commission’s willingness to press for a budget centred on areas that 
matter to long-term economic growth, putting the accents in the right 
places in many of its proposals. Yet the proposals fall short of abolishing 
existing measures of low European added value. 
Nevertheless, the Commission has published proposals that offer 
fertile grounds for negotiation. The budget is now under discussion in the 
Council and European Parliament. While the Parliament aligns itself 
closely with the Commission’s proposals, the discussions in the Council are 
still not based on policy considerations, but rather on the budget size and 
distribution. Driven by the present economic climate and the desire to 
reduce budget deficits at the national level, a number of member states are 
focusing on cutting the budget.  
The Commission is also proposing a complex set of strategy and 
oversight reforms, to rectify what many member states and the Court of 
Auditors have complained about over the years. But even in this regard 
serious discussions are not yet taking place.  
Unfortunately, the politically most expedient cuts are those in the 
areas of highest added value and highest growth returns to the EU. These 
correspond to areas that in theory are recognised by the net contributors as 
being vital to Europe’s future. Thus, member states should not treat the 
budget as a mere cost, but as an investment opportunity. It is time that 
member states discuss seriously the quality of EU expenditures and take 
very careful decisions on any ‘austerity cuts’. 
The EU budget is an essential instrument for Europe and it is 
important to remember the reasons for such a financial mechanism: 
•  The functioning and sustainability of the internal market requires a system 
of targeted budgetary transfers at the EU level owing to the uneven 
distribution of benefits across countries and regions of integration. 
•  In the areas of research and innovation, crucial for Europe’s future 
competitiveness, there are important economies of scale that can be 
fostered by the budget. AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 3 
 
•  Without the EU budget many objectives of the EU cannot be achieved and 
poorer member states will not be able to comply with all of the 
obligations of the acquis. 
•  The EU budget has a very important role in steering policies and leveraging 
funding from the private and public sectors. 
Key recommendations 
In the negotiations on the multi-annual financial framework, the member 
states need to focus on the long-term impacts, the European added value and the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the EU budget. Expenditures should be geared 
towards investing in long-term growth, the development of the internal market, 
European public goods and financing important EU objectives.  
There is a strong consensus among the Task Force members that the 
EU budget has a key role to play in the development of the internal market and 
thus long-term growth in the EU.  
The Task Force considers that it is of paramount importance that the 
emphasis on research and innovation is protected and reinforced. Cuts to the EU 
budget cannot be undertaken in areas that will undermine Europe’s 
capacity to compete globally and generate growth and jobs. No 
compromise can be acceptable in these areas. In practice, this means that: 
•  Funding for research and development under the Horizon 2020 programme 
should not be reduced.  
•  Funding to support the Strategic Energy Technology Plan, which will 
fundamentally change Europe’s way of using energy and therefore Europe’s 
economy, should be increased. The EU’s share of funding in the energy 
sector is highly important and significant. 
•  The European Commission’s proposals on the governance of the cohesion 
policy should be supported. The coherence among strategies for different 
funds has to be reinforced, including with member states’ own 
programmes in view of avoiding duplication. The proposal for smart 
specialisation strategies for the structural funds needs to be 
implemented, along with that for peer review of the strategies. More 
weight should be put on ex ante conditionality, monitoring and 
outputs, and less on procedures and ex post auditing. Procedures to 
act upon weak strategies and the lack of outputs, however, need to be 
clarified.  4 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
•  The proposed increase in the use of innovative financial instruments should 
be supported and even further expanded. Regarding project bonds, the Task 
Force considers that this instrument offers clear added value to the EU, as 
long as certain preconditions are met to ensure that only projects of a 
high level of European added value are pursued. 
On cross-border infrastructure, one of the crucial instruments to 
develop the internal market is the Connecting Europe Facility. It is thus 
recommended that the proposed level of funding is maintained. 
Notwithstanding the support for this budget line, the Task Force considers 
that the way in which funding is allocated has to be reviewed, increasing 
the share devoted to energy. 
If savings are necessary in the budget, they should be found in areas of low 
European added value, not in areas investing in the future innovative capacity of 
the EU. The Task Force agreed that the Common Agricultural Policy has an 
important role to play in the EU, but that policies are still suboptimal and 
thus the expenditure level unjustified based on the European added value 
and public goods criteria. Judicious savings in this policy can be achieved 
without compromising the positive aspects of the policy. Other savings could also 
be achieved by reducing expenditures in wealthier regions, when such spending 
does not have a clear European dimension in impact. 
The Task Force is concerned about the blind budgetary cuts on 
‘administration’ of the EU at a time when the governance of the EU needs to be 
reinforced. Savings in this area may well mean higher costs for the EU 
economy, not less. The development of agencies and institutions at the 
European level to handle the single market, such as air-traffic and rail-
traffic control, food safety, maritime safety and others, already reduce the 
cost of disparate regulatory bodies at the national level. Reinforcing the EU 
institutions is in many cases a saving, not a cost. 
The Task Force did not deliberate on the EU’s own resources, but it 
hopes that the discussion on resources does not overshadow the important 
discussions on the focus and quality of expenditures.  
The EU budget is an important tool to promote long-term sustainable 
growth in Europe. It is time it is recognised as such and decisions are taken 
in line with ensuring it operates effectively and efficiently towards this 
goal. | 5 
 
INTRODUCTION 
n its 29 June 2011 Communication on the next multi-annual financial 
framework (“A Budget for Europe”), the European Commission makes 
a strong commitment to the objective of knowledge-based growth and 
investment in European public goods.2 The principles espoused in this 
document deserve strong support.  
But when it comes to translating these ambitions into concrete 
proposals, there are far too many side-glances at the short-term national 
interests of various member states. This may be politically astute if success 
is measured by the ability to reach consensus, in the manner long 
established in European politics. Yet such victories are gained at the 
expense of policy foresight.  
Through creative accounting, a mainstreaming of climate and energy 
objectives and a judicious but demanding set of strategy, management and 
oversight proposals, the European Commission has offered a compromise 
proposal that has been accepted as a base for negotiation by all member 
states and the European Parliament. That is no minor feat. If this budget 
had been presented in 2004 for the 2007–13 period, it would have been a 
radical step forward. Today, however, this politically astute budget may 
not be ambitious enough to fulfil its potential role in helping to achieve the 
EU’s objectives.  
According to the Commission Staff Working Paper published 
simultaneously with the Communication, only 43% of present EU spending 
is devoted to initiatives supporting the Europe 2020 objectives.3 This will 
not change much in the reformed budget proposed for the next multi-
                                                      
2 Ibid. 
3 European Commission, A Budget for Europe 2020: The current system of funding, the 
challenges ahead, the results of stakeholders consultation and different options on the main 
horizontal and sectoral issues, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2011) 868 final, 
Brussels, 29 June 2011(b). 
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annual financial framework (MFF). By giving priority to continuity and 
vested interests, we are about to miss yet another opportunity to make the 
EU budget forward- rather than backward-looking.  
The Europe 2020 formula presented by the Commission of “smart 
growth, sustainable growth, inclusive growth” is attractive but it does not 
offer much help when it comes to making sharp budgetary choices. Almost 
any kind of EU spending produces short-term growth somewhere, but a 
multitude of such effects does not add up to a sensible and durable policy 
for growth. In this report we emphasise the need for investment in long-
term growth, and for impact the spread of investment across a wider area 
than a single country or region. European money should first and foremost 
be used for projects with a clear European dimension.  
The stakes are high. The financial turbulence now shaking Europe 
has made it even more obvious how much we depend on high-quality 
governance. If decisions are made under uncertainty, as they often must be, 
it becomes even more important to invest in follow-up, analysis and 
appropriate mechanisms for corrections. The missed opportunities and 
resources lost directly and indirectly through weak economic governance 
far exceed the costs linked to the EU budget.  
At the same time we should not underestimate the formidable gains 
made through European integration. Imperfect as they still are, the internal 
market and the monetary union have already provided very significant 
stimuli for growth and employment throughout the continent. Increasing 
mobility and an emerging common legal sphere create fertile preconditions 
for future economic exchange and cooperation.  
EU rules are in many ways more crucial for long-term European 
growth than EU expenditures, but the budget has an important role in 
supporting rule-making, rule implementation and learning from our 
experience with rules.  
This rule-making influence of the budget seems to be grossly 
undervalued by member states. Formally, one can summarise the roles of 
the budget as the following three: first is to assist poorer countries and 
regions to develop and to help them integrate into the single market; 
second is to support these countries in complying with costly obligations of 
the EU acquis; third is to help the EU achieve its objectives in areas where 
common action generates economies of scale with results of a higher value 
than separate actions by member states, i.e. the creation of the often-
misunderstood EU added value. Without EU budgetary assistance many AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 7 
 
core EU objectives will not be achievable. But there is another powerful 
indirect influence, i.e. rule-making. EU budget procedures, from formal 
administrative rules and budgetary oversight down to drafting strategies 
and programmes, deeply transform the governance systems and the 
investment policies of countries at record speed. This influence is far from 
negligible.  
While small and in no way sufficient by itself to address the crisis in 
Europe, the EU budget is the principal financial instrument for joint action 
by member states to face common challenges and reach common objectives. 
Given the limited size of the budget and the importance of its objectives, 
the costs of wasting resources for political expedience have increased. In 
economic terms it means that the opportunity costs of badly spent 
budgetary resources are greater. To a certain extent this has been 
understood, and proposals by the Commission that would most likely have 
been rejected outright a decade ago are today accepted as negotiable, such 
as the rather strong strategic planning, management and oversight 
requirements of the proposals. Even so, member states seem not to 
understand in this age of austerity that the opportunity costs of inefficient 
policies are not cuts, but better EU-financed interventions. It is also 
important to stress that the decisions are for a budget for the future 
running from 2014 to 2020, hopefully stretching beyond the era of financial 
crisis. Decisions on the future need to be based on future objectives rather 
than immediate, often short-term realities.  
This Task Force report focuses on key aspects that should be 
preserved and enhanced in the budget in line with the need to promote 
growth, employment and competitiveness in the long run. It highlights 
areas of European added value and where it would help to rationalise 
overall EU public expenditure. It is divided into four chapters: the first 
discusses the need to direct the EU budget towards long-term growth; the 
second identifies the policies to promote as long-term investments; the 
third considers the need to reinforce the targeting of European public 
goods; and finally, the fourth looks at governance. 8 | 
 
 
1.  THE EU BUDGET SHOULD BE A  
LONG-TERM INVESTMENT TOOL 
ince its establishment by the European Economic Community, the 
function of the EU budget has not been clearly defined. The EU 
budget is historically unique and has played a pivotal role in the 
development of the internal market by making it acceptable for member 
states. The budget has evolved over the years from a mainly political 
instrument of compensation to one for economic development and pan-
European objectives. It is today a hybrid between a political and an 
economic instrument. 
While this is perfectly understandable, there has been a lack of 
synchronisation with the addition of objectives, changes in policies and the 
size of the budget. In size, the budget has remained stable or even fallen in 
terms of the share of GNI over the last decade, despite the enlargements to 
significantly poorer member states. In the meantime, the ambitions of the 
EU have increased considerably in domains in which the EU budget is a 
necessary instrument. If the budget had been restructured in line with new 
needs as a consequence, this would not pose a significant problem. Yet 
such a restructuring has not occurred, nor does it seem politically possible 
that it will be undertaken to the level desirable for the next MFF. New 
ambitions are thus cash-starved and will remain partially so. 
There has nonetheless been a realisation at the political level that 
there is a mismatch between the demands, expectations and the principles 
that should govern a common budget. The subsidiarity principle, for 
example, indicates that the EU should not intervene in areas that can be 
better handled domestically.  
SAN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 9 
 
The budget deviated significantly in its policies and actions from 
applying the criteria that theories of fiscal federalism4 and the legally 
enshrined principles (subsidiarity, additionality and added value) would 
suggest. This means that the European dimension and added value of a 
number of actions financed by the EU budget are dubious. That has led to 
increasing calls for reform that would reinforce the targeting of the EU 
budget on those areas with a clear European added value. 
Defining the European added value of policies has not been 
straightforward. The European Parliament’s reflection paper on European 
added value5 by the SURE Committee6 mentions that “these enigmatic 
words are often used, unfortunately also in an inflationary way. Their 
multi-purpose use bears the risk that the phrase turns into ‘fashionable 
buzz words’ that quickly lose their meaning.” Despite this warning, the 
SURE Committee did identify features with which EU interventions should 
comply that include the added value criterion. These are expressed in terms 
of policies and expenditures having a transnational dimension, generating 
economies of scale from common action, bringing together a critical mass 
that single member states cannot provide alone, developing common 
policies and preferences that facilitate integration, helping member states to 
reach EU objectives or to reduce the costs of doing so through common 
coordination (or both). 
A number of concepts of European added value have been offered by 
the academic literature. According to one study dedicated to defining 
European added value, it exists in two cases. The first case is based on the 
simple economic rationale of economies of scale “where the limited scope 
of the member states and the existence of economic externalities reduce 
their propensity to take appropriate action”. The second case concerns the 
value of enhancing European cohesion, through common action and 
                                                      
4 Fiscal federalism is a branch of public policy analysis that seeks to determine the 
optimal distribution of responsibilities among different levels of governance based 
on cost efficiency.  
5 European Parliament, Reflection Paper on the Concept of European Added Value, 
SURE Committee, Rapporteur: Salvador Garriga Polledo, 21 September 2010. 
6 SURE refers to the Special Committee on Policy Challenges and Budgetary 
Resources for a Sustainable European Union after 2013. 10 | THE EU BUDGET SHOULD BE A LONG-TERM INVESTMENT TOOL 
 
projects that “make substantial contributions promoting the sense of 
community and the effective interaction in the European Union”.7 
Still, these concepts are not easy to make operational at today’s stage 
of negotiations on the budget. Given the diverse nature of the objectives 
and needs of the European Union, the list of policies and programmes that 
can be viewed as adding value is large. Furthermore, it is important to 
pinpoint that the European added value of a policy is not only dependent 
on its stated objectives, but also on the management system, funding tools 
and implementation. Policies that at face value appear to have a high 
added value fail to deliver it in practice.8  
This report tries to bring a view that is more operational and 
immediately applicable to the negotiations based on the current situation in 
the EU and the problems and objectives outlined in the Europe 2020 
strategy.9  
The EU faces difficult economic challenges and has complex 
objectives in the areas of energy and climate change. Defining the role of 
the EU budget in those areas needs to be the central focus of the budget for 
2014–20. The Task Force members agree that in addition to expenditures 
offering European added value, EU funding should represent an investment 
tool for long-term sustainable growth in the EU. The EU budget is not the 
appropriate instrument for expenditures aiming at short-term gains.  
This notion of using the budget as an investment tool for long-term 
growth has not been taken seriously enough in the past. It is true that the 
main instruments of the EU to promote growth are the development of the 
single market, the functioning governance of the euro and the influence of 
national macroeconomic policies. Common rules and the free movement of 
goods and services are the cornerstones of European economic growth. The 
EU budget is certainly too small to play a major role in promoting growth 
                                                      
7 D. Tarschys, The Enigma of European Added Value: Setting Priorities for the European 
Union, SIEPS Report 2005:4, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
Stockholm, 2005, p. 100. 
8 Contribution by Danuta Hübner (Task Force member) to the debate on European 
value added in the SURE Committee meeting of 23 September 2010. 
9 European Commission, Communication on EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels, 3 March 2010(a). AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 11 
 
directly. But that does not mean that the EU budget has no influence, as it 
can operate as a powerful interface. 
The EU budget can, through its leverage capacity, mobilise a 
multiplicity of funds from the public and private sectors for European 
objectives. Through the requirements to develop strategic plans for its use 
at the EU, national and regional levels, it influences policy decision-making 
on general public expenditures, particularly in cohesion countries. EU 
procurement rules also influence the way national public funding is 
directed. The EU budget, small as it is, affects the investment priorities of 
regions and member states. It clearly communicates with its funding what 
the EU is seeking.  
Unfortunately, the role of the EU budget has never been 
unambiguously defined as a tool for long-term growth. The strategic 
planning and monitoring of a large share of the budget expenditures has 
been left to national and regional authorities, which may not have had a 
long-term vision of investment and have understandably been interested in 
local preferences and fund absorption instead of European objectives. It is 
thus not surprising that the European Commission’s term review of the 
budget10 primarily considered strategy and oversight issues rather than 
general policy priorities. Approximately 80% of the EU’s funding and its 
day-to-day management are in the hands of national authorities,11 but the 
accountability of their actions to the European Commission and European 
Parliament is weak. 12 
EU budget expenditures for the cohesion policy and rural 
development are governed at the national/regional levels by strategies and 
operational programmes approved by the Commission. Through better ex 
ante conditionality, better reviews and stronger technical assistance, the 
focus of the funds on long-term investment can be sharpened. 
Influence in the member states is not limited to those two areas. 
Through its much smaller investment in research & development (R&D) – a 
                                                      
10 European Commission, Review of the EU budget, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SEC(2010) 7000, Brussels, 2010(b). 
11 More specifically, 80% of the EU budget is handled through shared management, 
which de facto means mainly at the national and regional levels. 
12 G. Cipriani, The EU budget: Responsibility without accountability, CEPS Paperback, 
Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2010. 12 | THE EU BUDGET SHOULD BE A LONG-TERM INVESTMENT TOOL 
 
mere 5% of the total EU expenditures on R&D – the EU budget has 
contributed considerably to promoting collaboration among research 
institutes in the EU with encouragingly positive outcomes.13 The 
development of the European research area and the European Research 
Council are further results of this collaboration. The European Commission 
has been using these experiences to move forward and develop new 
public–private partnerships in the area of research with the Joint 
Technology Platforms and the new energy-related European Industrial 
Initiatives. The developments in R&D show substantial achievements with 
limited resources, because these efforts act as a steering tool to foster joint 
European capacities. 
The EU budget thus has the potential to enhance the EU’s single 
market and growth by offering support to develop missing links that 
require joint EU action and by investing in capacity building, joint 
standards, strategic planning and monitoring instruments. One can 
conclude that the main objective of the EU budget is the efficient 
mobilisation of local resources towards EU objectives through financial 
incentives.  
The Europe 2020 strategy outlines the EU’s present objectives for 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which call for a better, long-term 
investment approach to public expenditures, including (or especially) by 
the EU budget. Yet the present budget bears little resemblance to the 
Europe 2020 objectives. The new proposals by the European Commission 
have made an effort to integrate the Europe 2020 strategy without 
restructuring the budget radically. As a result, the proposals for the 
cohesion policy, the research and development policy (Horizon 2020) and 
the policy on trans-European networks (the Connecting Europe Facility) 
incorporate the Europe 2020 objectives. Nevertheless, by preserving the 
funding distribution and structure of the budget close to the present one, 
the funding levels and distribution are still some distance away from 
corresponding to new priorities.  
We can, however, identify the key areas of investment with a high 
degree of European added value and long-term growth implications, 
namely  
                                                      
13 European Commission, Interim Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme, 
Final Report of the Expert Group, Brussels, 12 November 2010(c). AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 13 
 
•  reinforcing the innovative capacity of the Union and through this its 
future competitiveness; 
•  investing where needed to complete the infrastructure necessary to 
fully develop the single market; 
•  investing in EU public goods; and 
•  investing in knowledge-based governance and institutional support. 
This report concentrates on those areas, their importance and how they can 
be enhanced. 
 
 
In a nutshell: 
•  The EU’s budget is small in relation to its functions and 
needs to be very well targeted and efficient in seeking to 
achieve its objectives. 
•  The EU budget has a strong influence beyond its mere 
investments in redirecting national strategies and funding 
towards specific EU objectives. Badly targeted expenditures 
have important repercussions, not only wasting EU funds 
but also wasting national funds and administrative 
resources. 
•  The EU budget needs to assist in the completion of the 
internal market, including the energy market through cross-
border power interconnectors. 
•  The EU budget needs to use its leverage instruments to 
promote growth-enhancing investments, especially where 
economies of scale at the EU level are important, as in the 
case of R&D and innovation. 
•  The Commission’s capacity to evaluate strategies and 
monitor performance needs to be reinforced. 14 | 
 
 
2.  INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 
AND THE SINGLE MARKET 
his chapter identifies the actions that the EU budget should prioritise 
for the highest returns to investment in line with long-term growth 
objectives. The central instrument for long-term growth for the EU is 
the full realisation of the single market for goods, services and capital, 
underpinned by the freedom of movement for people. The main 
mechanisms to develop the single market are of course regulatory; 
nevertheless, the EU budget can intervene in a number of areas:  
1)  investing in collaboration across borders through multiregional cross-
border programmes that take advantage of the multitude of 
opportunities for increasing economies of scale, particularly in the 
areas of research and innovation; 
2)  developing the physical elements of a single market that promote 
economic integration and competitiveness; 
3)  facilitating the integration of regions and countries, by helping 
regions lagging behind to develop, to climb up the ladder of 
innovation and to benefit from the single market; and 
4)  financing European public goods that generate European added 
value, which would not have been created in the absence of EU 
support. 
While these four points seem very clear and are supported by 
theories of fiscal federalism and their adapted versions for the case of the 
EU, the implementation of the budget in practice has markedly deviated 
from them. The origin of the budget was to a large extent a political 
construct aimed at compensating groups or territorial entities considered 
rightly or wrongly at risk of loss from the creation of a single market. The 
use of the budget as an instrument of European economic policy has been 
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gaining importance with the deepening of the single market. The economic 
crisis is reinforcing the case for a budget that is used effectively as an 
investment instrument. These investments also need to be coordinated, 
building on synergies among the different policies and also national 
actions. 
This chapter explores the areas of the EU budget that are oriented 
towards investment and long-term growth, pinpointing the policies that 
need to be protected or promoted. These are research and development, the 
emphasis on innovation in the structural funds, the development of core 
cross-border infrastructure and the development of social and human 
capital. 
2.1  Investing for excellence in research and innovation  
The economic welfare of European nations in today’s highly competitive 
international market will greatly depend on the existence of industry that 
produces a high level of added value. Europe’s welfare depends on long-
term growth and hence sustained industrial competitiveness. This requires 
a strong foundation of innovation on which to build, and such a basis can 
only be developed through investment in research, development and 
innovation (RDI)14 and a pooling of resources and efforts at the European 
level.  
It is a widely accepted fact that there are considerable advantages in 
funding research at the EU level, mainly through economies of scale given 
that research becomes more efficient when it is undertaken on a larger 
scale. But there is much less consensus on how the funding should be 
allocated, and how much of the EU budget should be spent on RDI.  
The central funding mechanism at the EU level for basic and 
industrial research and innovation comes through the Framework 
Programmes, which started in 1984. Today we are at the Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7) with a budget of just over €50 billion for the 
2007–13 programming period. This represents less than 5% of total 
government expenditure on research in the EU, but it can be significant in 
                                                      
14 RDI is used throughout the report to refer to support going beyond basic 
research and development, funding in addition the stages before 
commercialisation – such as testing, demonstration and deployment – that the 
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the specific areas in which it intervenes. Public RDI expenditure in the 
member states also covers capital costs that the FP7 programme does not 
finance. In addition, it is important to point out that the cohesion policy 
invests an amount equivalent to the FP7 programme on research and 
innovation, albeit with a different focus, namely developing capacity, 
promoting innovation through the integration of key enabling technologies 
and fostering collaboration between businesses and industries (see section 
1.2).  
Up to FP6, the main aim was to facilitate collaboration among 
research centres and expand economies of scale in research and 
development, rather than promote concerted action to reach specific 
objectives. Today the EU’s RDI policies increasingly seek to foster the 
competitiveness of European industry, leveraging private investment in 
RDI and progressively assisting demonstration, deployment and 
commercialisation. This is particularly striking for energy, where the RDI 
policy has transformed into a ‘mission-oriented’ policy. 
This new central relevance of RDI has allowed the budget to increase 
in size and enabled this formerly loose policy to take centre stage and 
develop into a fully-fledged EU policy. The Europe 2020 strategy by the 
European Commission again calls for a substantial increase in RDI 
expenditure and coordination in the EU. This is reflected in the proposals 
for the EU budget, which call for a rise in funding for the successor 
Horizon 2020 programme. The budget proposals bring together under one 
financial heading the FP7, the entrepreneurship and innovation part of the 
existing Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) 
and funding for the European Institute for Innovation and Technology, in a 
single programme with €80 billion for the 2014–20 period – representing an 
increase of about 50% compared with the present 2007–13 budget even 
after deducting the addition of programmes presently not under FP7. 
The EU needs an active policy for RDI because it has important 
ambitions, such as creating a single European research area, reaching a 
total RDI expenditure (private and public) of 3% of EU GDP (presently at 
1.9%) and providing a technology push in the area of energy through the 
Strategic Energy Technology (SET) Plan.15 Without instruments at the EU 
                                                      
15 J. Nuñez Ferrer, C. Egenhofer and M. Alessi, The SET-Plan: From Concept to 
Successful Implementation, CEPS Task Force Report, Centre for European Policy 
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level these targets cannot be achieved. Furthermore, without coordination 
at the EU level, the risk of duplication between EU and national funding 
programmes increases. 
Nevertheless, it is very important to keep in mind that the central 
weakness in the EU in the area of research is in the private sector. The share 
of public sector investment in RDI on average is not less than in the US or 
Japan.16 Therefore, instruments need to concentrate on engaging the private 
sector through active collaboration and new financial instruments to 
leverage their investment. 
2.1.1  Reasons for public and specifically EU support in the area of 
RDI 
There are clear reasons for the support of RDI by the public sector, as well 
as assistance by the EU in particular. Public intervention is necessary when 
•  the research has no immediate commercial value and the results are 
unknown. Basic research can fundamentally only be financed by 
grants;  
•  the market and financial risks are too high for a private investor, i.e. 
the benefits are realised beyond a period in which a private investor 
requires a payback;  
•  the technology risks are too high, i.e. if large-scale technologies carry 
high risks of failure, for example at the demonstration or early 
deployment stages;  
•  a market failure exists, i.e. the real costs to society of some existing 
technologies are not internalised because of subsidies or because a 
technology does not pay its full cost, giving existing technologies an 
advantage over new ones; and 
•  investment in RDI is not rewarded by the market because the 
technology becomes freely available before a private investor can 
make a profit from it, i.e. there is insufficient return on intellectual 
property rights. 
                                                      
16 For comparisons of R&D expenditures among countries and sectors, see K. 
Uppenberg,  R&D in Europe, Expenditures across Sectors, Regions and Firm Sizes, 
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A particular need for the EU to take a leadership role arises in the 
case of RDI with important cross-border implications or with EU-wide 
scale effects. A leading EU role is especially indicated if the EU  
•  promotes cross-border collaboration and economies of scale, thereby 
capturing the full capacity within the EU and building upon the 
European research area and the more applied ‘Innovation Union’17 by 
improving cooperation and coordination;  
•  copes with the risks associated with new RDI projects and helps to 
reduce the risk of duplicating national or regional initiatives 
implemented in an uncoordinated fashion; and 
•  addresses RDI projects that are too big for any one member state or 
requires coordinated actions among member states to provide value.  
2.1.2  Bringing research from concept to market 
In the area of RDI, the EU needs to expand the scope of its support beyond 
basic research to drive innovation across the testing and demonstration 
phases until it is ready to attract venture capital. While maintaining the 
investment in basic and frontier research, there is a need to create a bridge-
financing mechanism to bring discoveries with potential commercial 
viability from the drawing board to the market. Expanding support 
through grants and innovative financial instruments is crucial to Europe’s 
research, technological and industrial leadership. The logic is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Basic research and early demonstration phases need to be funded 
by grants, as has been the case until now, because their commercial value is 
unknown. Once it is clear that the technologies could have potential, the 
costs of development may be so high and lead times so long that even if the 
economic rate of return (ERR) is theoretically positive, the risks make the 
project far too costly for private venture capital. Funding in the form of 
grants combined with risk capital by the EU budget and institutions like 
the European Investment Bank (EIB) can overcome the gap to the point 
where private financing alone is possible. 
A key to expanding RDI investment by the private sector is the 
development of instruments that allow the reduction of the risk premium 
of credit. For this the EU has created the Risk Sharing Finance Facility 
                                                      
17 The European Commission launched the Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative –
Innovation Union in October 2010 (COM(2010) 546 final, Brussels, 2010(d)). AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 19 
 
(RSFF), providing risk capital to cover potential losses in the financial 
sector from RDI investments over the advanced stages of innovation, 
demonstration and deployment. The RSFF covers risks through a guarantee 
set aside of €2 billion (€1 billion by the EU budget and an equivalent 
amount by the EIB) over the entire 2007–13 period to raise private risk 
capital in the value of approximately €10 billion, a leverage factor of 5.18 
Figure 1. Technology cycle and financial needs  
 
Source: Núñez Ferrer & Figueira (2011), p. 32. 
The RSFF has been taken up very quickly, with demand outstripping 
resources. Given its leverage factor and limited costs, this instrument has to 
be further expanded. It is also a vital instrument for promoting the SET 
Plan, as discussed in the next section. 
 
 
                                                      
18 For more information on the RSFF, refer to EIB, Evaluation of Activities under the 
Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), Operations Evaluation Unit, EIB, Luxembourg, 
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2.1.3  Investing to achieve the climate and energy objectives: The 
SET Plan 
The SET Plan deserves particular attention. The SET Plan is part of the EU’s 
research and development policy targeting the low-carbon technologies of 
the future. The Commission devised this policy because of the low level of 
investment and slow rate of development in the area of new energy 
technologies, given that without fundamental advances, the long-term 
decarbonisation objectives cannot be achieved. In addition, energy 
technologies are important economic drivers. The EU has been at the 
forefront of renewable energy technologies, but risks losing its competitive 
advantage in an increasingly competitive global market.  
The European Commission considers that there is a need to increase 
the investment in RDI in the energy sector from the present €3 billion a year 
to over €8 billion, seeking a total additional investment of €50 billion over 
the period to 2020. This is the amount considered necessary to bring to the 
market the technologies required to achieve the long-term objectives of the 
EU.19 
Getting the SET Plan right is a priority and it is deeply interlinked 
with the growth objectives of the EU, as indicated in the ‘Innovation Union’ 
strategy launched by the European Commission in October 2010.20 
Investing in energy transformation in the EU is an investment in a new 
economic model and new growth opportunities. 
The SET Plan brings a new dimension to the research policy of the 
EU, as it clearly addresses the need to cover the full development cycle of 
innovations, from basic research down to commercialisation. It offers the 
needed bridge financing as earlier shown in Figure 1.  
The SET Plan is a key policy because the financial role of the EU 
budget in the energy sector is very important. It covers approximately a 
third of total public expenditures on RDI in the sector or 11% of the total 
combined private and public RDI expenditures in the EU (data from JRC-
                                                      
19 European Commission, Communication on Energy 2020: A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM(2010) 639 final, Brussels, 10 
November 2010(e). 
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IPTS, 2009). Changes in the level of support by the EU can have a large 
bearing on the sector.  
For the EU to reach the investment targets in the sector, it is crucial 
that the EU budget invests more than the present share of the total funds, 
as every push to speed up technology development also represents a push 
towards more risky and less well-known technologies. A rise in investment 
by the EU budget of €2 billion annually for the SET Plan was considered 
necessary by a previous CEPS Task Force21 in order to leverage the 
necessary funding. It is unfortunate that this critical growth investment 
seems to be threatened by pressure to cut the EU budget. The Horizon 2020 
proposals, while increasing financial support for this sector, still fall short 
of the estimated needs calculated by CEPS research.22 
Along with higher EU grant support, the SET Plan needs risk-capital 
support, such as that provided by the RSFF. This instrument will be 
influential in helping to raise the level of RDI in energy and bring new, 
significant technologies to the market. If it is to make an impact in the 
energy sector, the RSFF will have to be strengthened substantially. The 
European Commission’s proposals for Horizon 2020 offer to set aside €1.1 
billion of the RSFF for the energy programme over the 2014–20 period. In 
the best of cases this would increase total public and private funding from 
€3 billion to €6.5 billion, with the remaining having to come from other 
private and national public sources. This assumes, however, that the 
leverage effect of the RSFF would remain constant, while a higher number 
of projects or a higher number of more risky projects would reduce the 
leverage size.  
                                                      
21 See Nuñez Ferrer, Egenhofer and Alessi (2011), op. cit. 
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2.2  Investing in innovation as a fundamental priority of the 
structural funds 
The European Commission has rightly proposed substantial reforms to the 
European structural funds, because in spite of the potential of the structural 
and cohesion funds to generate long-term growth, this has not happened in 
many regions. The policy has been very controversial; the link between 
growth and the structural funds has been difficult to establish and the 
performance of the funds across regions has greatly varied. High-growth 
regions have been presented as examples of regional policy successes by its 
defenders, and low-growth regions as negative examples by critics. The 
results of the EU’s structural policy have been particularly controversial 
because while there has been convergence of GDP per capita among 
member states, regional disparities have persisted. The present debt crisis, 
which is having particular effects on the cohesion countries, has in addition 
raised questions that undermine the policy – notably concerning why 
countries that have been supported for decades are so vulnerable. 
Still, much of the criticism and also praise for the funds is based on 
substantial misconceptions about economic development and the impact of 
In a nutshell: 
•  RDI needs a greater level of funding and the Commission’s 
proposed budget increases should be fully supported. 
•  The SET Plan is a key policy that needs a strong support by 
the EU budget. The funding that has been allocated to it 
should be increased. 
•  Member states should investigate and remove potential 
barriers that discourage private investment in innovation. 
•  There is a need to expand bridge capital to bring discoveries 
from the drawing board to the market, such as is provided by 
the Risk Sharing Financing Facility. 
•  The Risk Sharing Financing Facility instrument is vital to the 
technological and industrial competitiveness of the EU and 
needs to be expanded at least to the level proposed by the 
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assistance. First of all, even if poor regions are assisted to develop, this does 
not mean that their comparative disadvantage in relation to high-growth 
regions and economic centres will disappear or that their GDP per capita 
will catch up. The potential of regions to grow depends on a number of 
factors, from geographical to demographic ones. Second, the impact of 
regional funds depends substantially on national plans for the distribution 
of the funds, and thus performance is strongly linked to the quality of 
strategies and their implementation. The European Commission has not 
been able to ensure quality across the board. Serious attempts to improve 
the strategies of member states and regions have really just started in the 
present programming period with the requirement for member states to 
present a more integrated and coherent National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF), the results of which are too early to assess.  
A general philosophy in the past and current programming periods 
has been that the funds belong to the regions and that their use should 
therefore not be dictated by Brussels. Member states have prevented the 
build-up of appropriate monitoring systems and indicators, with the 
exception of funds’ ‘absorption’ measures – which would by their nature 
encourage the selection of ‘quick-to-spend programmes’ rather than 
investments with the highest level of added value and with long-term 
benefits. The oversight of strategies and accountability has been and 
remains weak.23 
With the growing realisation that the EU budget needs to be directed 
at achieving core EU objectives and address weak growth performance, the 
Commission has proposed to integrate rather strong strategic and 
monitoring instruments in the cohesion policy. These aim at promoting 
strategies that develop the endogenous growth potential of regions.24 
What regional policy strategies need, and what successful regions 
have generally applied, are the following characteristics: 
                                                      
23 See Cipriani (2010), op. cit. 
24 Endogenous growth is defined as the economic growth generated in a region 
based on its internal resources. A short overview of the integration of endogenous 
growth elements in EU policies can be found in J. Núñez Ferrer, The Evolution and 
Impact of EU Regional and Rural Policy, FAO–World Bank Working Paper, FAO, 
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•  better integrated, long-term strategies that are growth-oriented, with 
coherence and a deep level of integration among the different 
programmes, as well as with national policies; 
•  the use of effective indicators and monitoring systems; 
•  a reduced emphasis on large infrastructure as a growth strategy, 
which can lead to overcapacity and generate considerable 
maintenance costs; and 
•  much higher investment in human capital and innovation. 
There is today as much need for a strong cohesion policy as before, 
but its objectives, planning and implementation require a far subtler 
approach. In the absence of an active cohesion policy Europe could face 
two consequences: first, the internal market could be put into question by 
poorer countries in particular, which opened their borders; and second, 
many EU objectives would not be achieved in poorer regions and countries, 
for example the environmental acquis or the renewable energy objectives. 
It is clear that the cohesion policy should go beyond solidarity and 
financial transfers to poorer regions. The main function of the funds has to 
be to help the regions become more competitive and increase the rate of 
growth in a sustainable fashion, improving living standards and 
employment prospects. In addition the funds should provide financial 
assistance to help the regions comply with the EU’s standards, such as 
environmental regulations, and to achieve EU objectives. Given the 
economic crisis, the increasing international competition in trade and new 
climate and energy challenges, there are significant and serious areas in 
which the EU’s cohesion policy could and should intervene.  
The proposals of the European Commission25 have correctly 
identified the need to focus on developing the economic potential of 
regions, placing competitiveness and innovation at the forefront of the 
strategies in place. In the present financial perspectives, investments linked 
to developing the research and innovation capacities already rival in size 
the Framework Programme for research and development, but the quality 
of strategic planning needs improving. “Strengthening research, 
                                                      
25 European Commission, Proposal for a regulation on specific provisions concerning the 
European Regional Development Fund and the investment for growth and jobs goal and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006, COM(2011) 614 final, Brussels, 6 October 
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technological development and innovation” is priority no. 1 for the 
structural funds in the proposed new regulations (Article 5).  
To this end, the Commission proposes to substantially reinforce 
strategic requirements in the planning phase for the structural funds. This 
requires the preparation of a national or regional smart “research and 
innovation strategy for smart specialisation  in line with the National 
Reform Program, to leverage private research and innovation expenditure, 
which complies with the features of [a] well-performing national or 
regional research and innovation system”.26 This strategy will need to be 
integrated and coherent with the wider Common Strategic Framework, a 
strengthened and more comprehensive version of today’s NSRF, which 
member states had to submit for this programming period. Most 
importantly, the Commission proposes to have the innovation strategies 
peer-reviewed. This is a very commendable idea. The review should be 
undertaken by selected external experts, avoiding the present 
incompatibility of the Directorate-General (DG) for Regional Policy having 
to evaluate programmes and simultaneously be under pressure to approve 
them on time before the programming period starts.  
Tailored strategies need to be developed, as the barriers to innovation 
vary across countries and a one-size-fits-all approach is not to be pursued. 
The analysis by Reinstaller & Unterlass (2011) from the Austrian Institute of 
Economic Research,27 which was used as input into the competitiveness 
report of the European Commission,28 points out that the barriers to 
innovation differ substantially by country, related to the stage of economic 
development and specific structural factors. 
The innovation strategy for the structural funds is not to be confused 
with the Framework Programme (Horizon 2020), which emphasises 
excellence and research, but should nonetheless be coherent with it. The 
                                                      
26 M. Landabaso, “Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation and the New 
Structural Funds Regulations 2013-20”, Regional Innovation Monitor project, 27 
October, presented at the CEPS Task Force meeting on 6 December 2011. 
27 A. Reinstaller and F. Unterlass, “Comparing business R&D across countries over 
time: A decomposition exercise using data for the EU 27”, Applied Economics Letters, 
Vol. 19, No. 12, 2011, pp. 1143-1148. 
28 European Commission, Innovation Union Competitiveness Report, edition 2011, 
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Brussels, 2011(d). 26 | INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
structural funds are aimed at improving local capacity and 
entrepreneurship through innovative solutions, and a better understanding 
and integration of technologies by businesses – ultimately for economic 
growth and job creation. The funds should promote endogenous growth, 
developing the economy based on investment in the endowments of the 
region, making use of what the Commission calls competitive (constructed) 
advantage. The word ‘constructed’ denotes new activities that can be 
developed from scratch and not just the maintenance and promotion of 
existing structures and businesses, as long as the new activities are 
sustainable in the longer term. The attention given to the development and 
use of key enabling technologies (KETs) is interesting. KETs are considered 
the backbone of the future economy, e.g. micro and nanoelectronics, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology and photonics.29 This is actually a re-
emergence of industrial development policies. The EU’s structural policies 
are seen as an instrument to foster and make industries more competitive 
through the support of KETs.  
The strategy should be linked to the Horizon 2020 programme. The 
smart specialisation strategy should aim where appropriate at bringing the 
RDI capacity of regions to a standard that enables them to participate in 
Horizon 2020. 
Furthermore, actions supported by the structural funds are to be 
bolstered by a strategy to expand the use of ICT and such instruments as 
JEREMIE,30 which uses revolving funds to provide loans for businesses and 
other financial instruments leveraging private sector funding.  
The proposals of the European Commission are commendable and in 
comparison with the present policy represent substantial advances in the 
right direction. The policy, at least formally, does seem to reduce the 
                                                      
29 The Commission, in its Communication on Preparing for our Future: Developing 
a common strategy for key enabling technologies in the EU, COM(2009) 512 final, 
Brussels, 30 September 2009, presented these technologies and a high-level expert 
group proposed policy measures to promote the industrial take-up of KETs (see 
European Commission, High-Level Expert Group on Key Enabling Technologies, Final 
Report, Brussels, 28 June 2011(e)). 
30 Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises: A European Union 
programme to support micro and medium enterprises through equity, loans or 
guarantees, through a revolving Holding Fund funded by the EU budget acting as 
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discretion of member states in the use of the funds by requiring better 
justification for actions with a more concrete list of priorities. There will be 
some resistance to these changes, with a risk that the list is expanded and 
thereby the focus is diluted and the meaningfulness of strategies is 
weakened. It is crucial that the strategic orientation of the policy is preserved, as 
well as the primary emphasis on innovation. This approach will challenge regions 
to improve policy coherence and coordination, as well as promote investments with 
positive, long-term growth implications. A new culture of strategic planning 
and delivery based on sound economic analysis and implementation needs 
to be introduced with the checks and balances. As guardian of the Treaty, 
the Commission should monitor the fulfilment by member states of the 
established conditionality and ensure that the use of EU funds is not 
affected by non-compliance with the requirements. Nevertheless, the 
improvement in ex ante requirements needs to be accompanied by 
simplification.  
2.2.1  Funding level and distribution of funds 
The calculation of the funding levels for the regions is a weak element in 
the proposals, which does not challenge the idea that all regions need to 
benefit from EU funds (Table 1). While there is some rationale for 
maintaining some support to regions with a GDP per capita of between 
75% and 90% of the EU average and which is correctly digressive, the need 
for EU funding at the level proposed for other regions beyond 90% is 
questionable. The latter regions already have access to policies like the 
R&D Framework Programmes, INTERREG, rural development funds, the 
Connecting Europe Facility and the European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund for crisis situations.  
The proposals also require a substantial minimal share of the funds to 
be invested in the European social fund (ESF), from 25% in less developed 
regions to 50.2% in more developed regions. 
Taking the subsidiarity principle in its strict sense, the justification for 
using European structural funds in more developed regions is debatable, 
particularly when these programmes do not have a European dimension 
and can be handled better at the local level. This criticism does not 
prejudge whether the actual interventions have positive results in the 
beneficiary region, but the fact that the EU tackles problems that member 
states can finance themselves and whose European dimension is 
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Table 1. European Commission’s proposals for cohesion funds 
Proposed budget 
for 2014–20 
€ billion  Minimum 
ESF share 
(%) 
Resulting 
minimum 
 ESF amount  
(€ billion) 
Less developed regions 
Transition regions 
More developed regions 
Territorial cooperation 
Cohesion fund 
Extra allocation for the 
outermost and sparsely 
populated regions 
162.6 
38.9 
53.1 
11.7 
68.7 
0.926 
25 
40 
52 
– 
– 
– 
40.7 
15.6 
27.6 
– 
– 
– 
Connecting Europe Facility 
for transport, energy and 
ICT 
€40 billion (with an 
additional €10 billion 
ring-fenced under the 
cohesion fund) 
–  – 
Source: European Commission (2011k), p. 5. 
In the case of ESF interventions, for example, action undoubtedly has 
to be taken to reduce social exclusion in wealthier regions. The question is 
rather one of whether the EU budget should be involved or if that is the 
competence and obligation of the member state governments. For poorer 
member states, there is a strong rationale for support, as in relative terms 
they face higher fiscal constraints. Moreover, many cohesion countries do 
not have the appropriate policies, capacity or infrastructure in place. 
In the wealthiest regions, the ESF or INTERREG31 could still finance 
programmes for the exchange of practices and collaboration in this field.  
These questions should be posed for a number of actions with a local 
dimension. The EU budget should ensure that the programmes supported 
by the EU complement and do not substitute for national actions. The 
present EU additionality rules32 unfortunately look only at total public 
expenditure and not at its distribution.  
                                                      
31 INTERREG is an EU programme funding programme in which regions 
cooperate across borders on common projects (see section 2.2.2).  
32 Additionality is one of the official principles of the structural funds introduced in 
1988. It requires that EU funds must be additional and not substitute member state 
funds. However, it does not look into the specific policy area, thus national funds 
can be shifted to another area of expenditure without affecting additionality.  AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 29 
 
2.2.2  INTERREG – Underfunded and neglected 
More surprising in the proposal is the large financial envelope for the 
developed regions compared with the territorial cooperation programme 
(INTERREG), an area that is quintessentially a matter for the EU and 
central for European integration and the development of the single market. 
In financial terms, however, the budgetary priorities of the cohesion policy 
seem centred on local benefits, something that can only be defended to 
support regions catching up and becoming more competitive and to 
finance EU objectives. 
The INTERREG programme is probably one of the most understated 
programmes in the European budget, weakly financed and generally 
unknown to many. It nonetheless carries out one of the fundamental roles 
of the EU budget, which is to increase cross-border collaboration and 
eliminate barriers in the single market. The funding in regions with a GDP 
per capita of over 90% of the EU average should be reduced, while the 
INTERREG resources should be augmented to promote cross-border 
cooperation programmes. 
2.2.3  Earmarking 
Since the earmarking exercise began in the present budget to increase 
investment in areas in line with the Lisbon strategy, new various areas for 
earmarking have been proposed. Earmarking minimum levels of funding 
for specific EU expenditures can be useful, but should be used based on a 
solid analysis and rationale. In the case of the minimum shares of ESF 
expenditure for the structural funds, there does not seem to be such a solid 
analysis. Earlier, this report questioned the European added value of ESF 
expenditures in areas that should be the responsibility of the member states 
and regions, particularly in the more developed parts of the EU. The ESF 
policy is wide open to numerous interventions, which often reflect a local 
rather than a European dimension. It also does not focus on excellence and 
cross-border collaboration, as is the case for the Horizon 2020 programme.  
The shares of ESF expenditure across regions and countries vary 
substantially and the minimum shares proposed by the Commission will 
entail a large increase in some. Is this increase justifiable based on the needs 
of the specific regions? An inappropriate use of earmarking can thus be 
counterproductive. If ex ante strategic planning supported by appropriate 
review is seriously undertaken, earmarking for the ESF should not be 
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2.3  Investing through the Connecting Europe Facility 
In the area of large cross-border infrastructure in transport and energy, it is 
important that the EU invests through the EU budget and other financial 
instruments to support the development of an integrated transport and 
energy grid and the transition to a sustainable energy system. Until today, 
t h i s  h a s  b e e n  t h e  r o l e  o f  p r o g r a mmes for trans-European networks for 
transport and energy (TEN-T and TEN-E, respectively), which emerged 
f r o m  a  c o mm i t m e n t  i n  t h e  T r e a t y  o f  Maastricht. This led to the first 14 
transport priority projects agreed at the Essen European Council in 1994.  
In a nutshell: 
•  The proposals to make research and innovation the main 
priorities of the EU’s structural operations must be 
defended and promoted. 
•  Strategic planning is a cornerstone for the effectiveness of 
EU funds and needs to be reinforced. The proposals for the 
peer review of smart specialisation strategies should be 
preserved. The monitoring of progress and the shift to ex 
ante conditionality rather than ex post auditing needs to be 
ensured. 
•  Regional funding should not be offered to regions with an 
income per capita of over 90% of the EU average, except for 
those programmes with a strong European dimension. 
Cohesion policy is excessively centred on local benefits, 
particularly in the case of more developed regions, which 
have the ability to cover such costs nationally. 
•  INTERREG, a quintessentially European instrument that 
ticks most boxes pertaining to what the EU budget should 
support, is underfunded. 
•  Earmarking exercises should be based on a solid rationale, 
as the balance of expenditure priorities should be based on 
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It is not the purpose of this report to evaluate the performance of the 
programmes; it suffices to mention that funding was scarce and the 
collaboration among member states weak. In 2001 only three of the projects 
were completed. The expansion of the TEN-T network did not accelerate 
much despite the request of the High-Level Group report in 2003 headed 
by Transport Commissioner Karel Van Miert33 to strengthen the policy and 
speed up implementation.  
Developing the trans-European networks has since increased in 
importance and the single market is no longer the only reason. Energy 
security and climate change policies have added urgency to the 
development of the transport and energy corridors and given the trans-
European networks a new lease of life, putting them back in the centre of 
EU policy and in the minds of the political decision-makers. Of course the 
new policy objectives require a rethink of the network we are seeking to 
build, and the European Commission has produced a new strategy with 40 
priority transport projects,34 integrating the need for a low-carbon transport 
sector.  
With respect to energy, progress in grid integration has been even 
more sluggish than in transport. Energy security and provision has long 
been seen as a national priority. Interconnectors have generally not been 
promoted by member states except where required for energy security. The 
interest in integrating the energy network across Europe has increased, as 
member states struggle to reduce emissions in the energy sector and no 
longer see the European grid as a threat, but an opportunity to develop 
new markets and enhance energy security. Of course the position of 
member states on this issue is strongly influenced by the national potential 
to generate energy from renewable sources. A change in the way energy is 
produced and distributed can create new markets that offer economic and 
employment opportunities that member states need. The European 
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Commission has also released new important regulations in this area, on 
the guidelines governing trans-European energy networks.35 
On the financial side, the investment requirements in the area of 
transport and energy are very large and will call for assistance from the 
public sector36 and the elaboration of an appropriate regulatory framework. 
The nature and level of support required varies depending on the 
infrastructure and the market. The European Commission estimates that to 
complete the priority European power and gas networks, the investment 
needed is in the range of €200 billion until 2020, half of which will have to 
be supported by the public sector. For transport the Commission estimates 
that €500 billion will be needed for the trans-European networks, of which 
€250 billion is required to complete the missing links of the core network. 
Here it does not present any figures on the share of public investment 
relative to private investment. For ICT networks, the Commission estimates 
that without any public intervention there will be an investment gap until 
2020 of €220 billion, a figure necessary to fulfil the objective of having all 
businesses and households covered by broadband. 
The European Commission has thus proposed a considerable increase 
in investment for the trans-European networks for energy, transport and 
ICT through the EU budget and also through potentially new financial 
instruments supported by the EIB. The proposal of the Commission is to 
create a €40 billion facility in the European budget for the next MFF, 
boosted by €10 billion earmarked from the cohesion funds.37 Compared 
with the total size of the investment, this budget line seems to fall short, but 
it is important to highlight that the EU budget is conceived to be a co-
financing instrument and a substantial funds multiplier, for example in its 
role as a guarantee instrument.  
The Task Force recommends that the Connecting Europe Facility be 
kept at the level proposed, although modest in view of the challenges, 
emphasising that the Facility should operate as a facilitator rather than a 
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Brussels, 19 October 2011(g). 
36 This includes national public funds, the EU budget and public investment banks. 
37 European Commission, Communication on a Growth Package for Integrated 
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financier of projects. The lion’s share of the investment needed must come 
from the market itself. Means provided by the EU budget should not be 
perceived as reducing the need for a rigorous economic evaluation of 
projects, regulatory development, risk-compensation incentives, cross-
border cost allocations or public acceptance. Energy and transport are 
central pillars of the internal market and indirect drivers of Europe’s 
economy. Combined with the climate and energy objectives, the transport 
and energy networks are the pillars to support the objectives on energy 
security, low-carbon energy (renewable energy) and low-carbon transport. 
The investments should be understood as opportunities and foundations 
for future growth prospects.  
One way of making this explicit while at the same time supporting 
the long-term objectives of the energy sector to reach decarbonisation is to 
actively allocate financial aid from the EU to pilot projects for new 
infrastructure technology. One example could be the installation of 
AC/DC38 conversion with a capacity increase in existing overhead lines.  
If well deployed, the returns on investment by the Connecting Europe 
Facility through the economic development of Europe will be high. 
Marginal savings to the public purse from a cut to this budget line would 
be overshadowed by the welfare losses from a weaker internal market, a 
lower degree of energy security and higher dependency on energy inputs, 
notably on increasingly costly fossil fuels.  
2.3.1  Funding level and distribution of funds 
Nevertheless, the distribution of funding for infrastructure proposed by the 
European Commission (Table 2) is questionable. While it is true that 
transport is financed more heavily by the public sector, it is debatable 
whether energy funding should be put on a par with ICT and digital 
investments. One of the particularities of the ICT and digital sector is that 
private sector investment is high, demand is strong and cross-border 
operations have emerged naturally. It is clear that the figures have been 
selected based on a pro rata calculation of the estimated public share of the 
investments. Yet there is no apparent attempt to estimate the variation in 
                                                      
38 Convertors from alternating current to direct current. Direct current can be 
transferred with lower losses over larger distances, while Europea energy system is 
based on alternating current. 34 | INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
the leverage effect or the demand-side characteristics of the energy 
compared with the ICT sector.  
Another surprising factor is that the amounts earmarked from the 
cohesion fund for infrastructure related to the Connecting Europe Facility 
are  only for transport infrastructure, while the energy and ICT needs are 
considerable in the new member states. This restrictive focus needs to be 
justified, as cross-border energy transmission is also of central importance 
in the new member states.  
Table 2. Amounts allocated to the Connecting Europe Facility 
Areas covered  Amount (€ billion) 
Connecting Europe Facility, of which  40 
•  Energy  9.1 
•  Transport  21.7 
•  ICT/digital  9.2 
Amounts earmarked in the cohesion fund for transport 
infrastructure 
10 
Total  50 
Source: European Commission (2011a), p. 57. 
2.3.2  Using project bonds to develop core infrastructure 
The European Commission, in a recent publication, has proposed a pilot 
phase for project bonds.39 It is limited to investment in the Connecting 
Europe Facility for the period 2012–13. 
The project bonds, which in no way are to be confused with 
‘Eurobonds’, are an expansion of the existing LGTT (Loan Guarantee 
Instrument for TEN-T projects), which until now has not been very 
effective in attracting private equity, and as the name indicates, has been 
limited to transport. Moreover, the infrastructure required to build the 
trans-European energy, transport and ICT networks calls for levels of 
private funding well beyond the leverage capacity of the LGTT.  
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The project bonds tackle the difficulties of attracting finance from 
traditional financiers (banks and monoline insurance companies offering 
debt service guarantees). The project bonds correctly seek to attract funding 
from more conservative long-term investors, in particular the pension 
funds. To do so this initiative proposes that the EU budget offers a first-loss 
debt guarantee of 10% and the EIB a second loss of 10%, which would 
increase the credit rating of projects. An increase in the credit rating would 
make the project bonds attractive to private equity investors. 
The project bonds are a necessary tool to develop the infrastructure, 
but policy-makers need to understand that project bonds are another debt 
instrument, which ultimately needs to be repaid and is thus only to be used 
for projects with a high degree of added value and a sound Economic Rate 
of return (ERR). Additional grant support for specific projects could also be 
envisaged when the high-value social returns cannot be captured by 
private investors. But it is important that projects are not ‘excessively’ 
subsidised, transferring unnecessary risks to the taxpayer. Subsidies should 
not be used to attract institutional investors for projects with unsound 
ERRs by raising their credit rating. Project bonds are to be used to make 
projects of high added value feasible, not bad projects attractive to 
investors. 
 
In a nutshell: 
•  The cross-border infrastructure is an essential element of the 
internal market and the Connecting Europe Facility needs to 
be appropriately funded. 
•  The support from the EU budget for infrastructure should not 
reduce the need for strict economic criteria for project 
selection. EU funding should mainly have the function of 
incentivising the private sector and not replacing it. 
•  A core function of the funds should be to assist pilot projects 
for new grid technologies. 
•  The ‘project bond’ initiative should be supported, but the 
selection criteria for projects and the rate of total public 
support should be based on strict economic criteria. Project 
bonds are to be used to make projects of high added value 
feasible, not bad projects attractive to investors. 36 | INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE AND THE SINGLE MARKET 
 
2.4  Investing in Europe’s human and social capital, and in 
employability 
Growth depends on the skills of citizens and it is imperative that EU 
funding promotes human capital formation through its different funding 
programmes. This has to occur, however, based on the subsidiarity 
principle, which means that targeting has to be sharpened. The bulk of 
investments in education and training are made at the national level. The 
EU budget should concentrate mainly on collaborative projects, from RDI 
initiatives through its excellence-driven Framework Programmes (the 
future Horizon 2020) down to student exchanges through the ERASMUS40 
Programme. 
For poorer regions, the European Commission’s emphasis on 
building the capacity for innovation is to be commended. The EU budget 
can assist countries to develop their infrastructure for education, training 
and research. But even here, its contribution is marginal relative to national 
efforts and must therefore aim at particularly strategic interventions, with a 
cross-national dimension.   
Funding in the area of lifelong learning and rejoining the labour force 
should be targeted at the poorer regions and digressively at transition 
regions. Regions with a GDP per capita over 90% of the EU average should 
be required to provide these services under the national/regional budgets. 
The EU budget can still finance common projects in these areas and 
promote European best practices, but it should not replace national efforts. 
Innovative finance initiatives at the EU level, such as microfinance 
schemes for the self-employed and for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) can be continued, as the leverage factor is important and the results 
seem to be encouraging. There is a case to be made for promoting similar 
schemes to firms wherever they are located in the EU to avoid single 
market distortions, focusing on differences in access to finance among 
member states. EU financial instruments should avoid substituting for 
existing national schemes and especially avoid unduly subsidising financial 
institutions. The EU’s JEREMIE initiative for providing loans to SMEs has 
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run into difficulties, as it has not always been possible to ascertain that the 
subsidised interest rates are de facto transferred to the beneficiaries.  
On social capital investments, these should be supported in poorer 
regions and to a digressive level in transition countries. The EU budget 
should not serve as a substitute for the obligations of the national budgets 
in wealthier regions. 
 
 
 
In a nutshell: 
•  Key support for human capital development is provided by 
the European RDI programmes through Horizon 2020 and 
by cross-border education programmes such as Erasmus, 
and these programmes should be promoted. 
•  The EU should assist in developing the infrastructure for 
education and research in poorer regions to enhance 
competitiveness and long-term growth potential. This 
should be primarily for strategic investments with a cross-
national dimension and to strengthen the ability of the 
poorer member states to join Horizon 2020 programmes. 
•  Financial instruments for micro-enterprises and SMEs seem 
to bring positive results and could be explored further, but 
it should be ensured that they do not substitute for national 
schemes and that the benefits are de facto transmitted to 
the final beneficiaries and not appropriated by financial 
institutions. 
•  The EU budget can assist in developing the social 
infrastructure in poorer regions, especially in cohesion 
countries.  
•  In wealthier regions the EU budget should refrain from 
financing social programmes that do not have a European 
dimension. 38 | 
 
 
3.  THE EUROPEAN ADDED VALUE OF 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE EFFICIENCY 
OF EXPENDITURES  
his chapter is devoted to the expenditures related to public goods 
with limited relevance for economic growth. A case in point is the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and thus it deserves special 
mention. Yet the EU also has a role to play in the environment and has 
recently launched a roadmap on resource efficiency, which is briefly 
analysed.  
3.1  A focus on European public goods in agriculture and rural 
development  
An important area in which the EU budget intervenes is agriculture, 
because full competence in this sector has been transferred to the EU, and 
therefore it is in fact the only fully common policy. This full financing of 
agriculture has large repercussions, as it absorbs a substantial share of 
resources available in the EU budget. This has a bearing on the ability to 
intervene effectively in other areas. 
While the agricultural policy has undergone a number of reforms, 
which to a large extent have successfully reduced the market and trade 
distortions it generated, its size in terms of cost is substantial. The 
agricultural and rural policies of the EU take up nearly 40% of the EU 
budget, 70% of which is in the form of direct payments41. Direct payments 
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are a very inefficient and distortive policy, suffering large deadweight 
costs. Unfortunately, rather than continue their phasing-out, the proposals 
for the next MFF are primarily geared towards redistributing the 
agricultural pie of direct payments, even bolstering such payments while 
neglecting the second pillar of the CAP, namely rural development. The 
proposals actually weaken the rural development policy, which should be 
the first and main pillar of the CAP with income support limited to specific 
and justified cases. 
The proposals for the CAP seem once again to concentrate on the 
wrong things. Rather than redirecting funding based on needs on the 
ground and directly tackling the considerable waste of resources, the 
reforms are chiefly concerned with redistributing the funding among 
member states. In terms of added value, European and even local, the 
policy paints an unconvincing picture (Núñez Ferrer & Kaditi, 2007). 
The proposed greening of the direct payments loses much of its 
meaning owing to the impossibility of transferring the funds among 
member states or even regions. Also, monitoring compliance on green 
practices will require extensive and costly monitoring. Failing such efforts, 
even a reformed CAP will end up being a very weakly enforced policy not 
meeting its objectives. 
That is unfortunate, because the agricultural sector is confronting real 
challenges stemming from climate change. The policy does not allocate 
funding based on the expected impact of climate change, nor is the policy 
flexible on issues of market price variability. A constant level of subsidy 
cannot be justified by market fluctuations. 
The agricultural policy is continuing its operations rather impervious 
to the realities on the ground, based on ill-defined ‘income’ or 
‘environmental’ justifications, badly targeted and subservient to net 
balance considerations. 
It is clear that politically it will be hard to reform the policy 
satisfactorily. Even the limited steps in the right direction proposed by the 
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Commission may not be adopted. Some proposals are encouraging, such as 
those for innovation. The proposed increase in funding for research in 
agriculture, an area where investment has been deficient worldwide, is 
welcome, but overall the emphasis given to innovation and restructuring in 
the sector is still not strong enough. 
As more radical reform is difficult to achieve at this time, what 
matters is that this state of affairs does not negatively affect the changes 
required in other budgetary headings, and does not undermine those 
expenditures that are central to the single market and the future economic 
strength of the EU.  
If the member states are seeking to reduce the level of expenditures of 
the EU budget, it is in the area of direct payments (which in large part are 
badly distributed and consist of substantial deadweight costs) that savings 
could still be made. If direct payments are primarily income support, then 
based on the realities of the sector farms in real difficulties could be 
targeted and helped better for less money.  
Global agricultural markets have changed substantially since the 
payments were first introduced in the early 1990s. World commodity prices 
are rising and expected to continue doing so. Farms are also producing 
non-food products, such as biofuels. These changes do not seem to be 
reflected in the distribution of the support, which is rather blind to the very 
large income differences and their causes across farms. The political 
barriers are clearly significant, but the economic implications for the EU of 
well-targeted cuts in areas with the highest welfare losses, such as the CAP, 
would be minimal, even positive if one considers the opportunity costs. 
It is also unfortunate that while in other areas there has been an 
obvious attempt to promote public–private partnerships, this is still foreign 
to the CAP proposals. A larger fund for sudden crises in the sector has been 
specified without considering the potential of using private insurance 
schemes to deal with some aspects of extreme events. The CAP needs a 
better distribution of risks between the public and private sectors, which 
also promotes precautionary actions. The role of the insurance sector needs 
to be explored further. 
3.2  Sustainable investment: Environmental and resource 
efficiency 
The EU has an important influence on the environment, for example due to 
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policies. But the budget has major implications beyond these two policies. 
The cohesion funds and regional development funds finance diverse facets 
of the environmental infrastructure and are essential to help new member 
states comply with the EU’s environmental requirements. 
There is still a striking mismatch between ambitions and policies. 
Unnoticed by many, the Commission unveiled a resource efficiency 
roadmap for 2050.42 This document presents an interesting strategy for 
resource efficiency, including a considerable number of objectives to be 
completed already by 2020. While the objectives are valuable, the EU 
budget proposals do not reflect the roadmap sufficiently. There is a need to 
bring more coherence to the different objectives and the EU budget. How 
will the objectives of the roadmap be taken into account in structural 
funding? Why is the LIFE+43 programme so small if the environment is so 
central to the 2020 strategy, if one is to follow the logic of the roadmap? 
There is undoubtedly much to commend the promotion of an efficient, 
lifecycle approach to resources.  
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In a nutshell: 
•  The CAP proposals still retain a large degree of financially 
unjustified spending. Cuts in the EU budget should be sought 
in this policy unless the policy is further reformed. 
•  As far as possible the Council should press to improve the 
targeting of the policy. 
•  Rather than continue to protect the sector from extreme 
events primarily through budgetary transfers, which 
encourage moral hazard in the sector, what is needed is a 
better distribution of responsibilities and risks with public–
private partnerships with the insurance sector. 
•  The EU has outlined important objectives for resource 
efficiency, but the budget proposals hardly touch on the 
issue. The funding and EU objectives for the environment 
should be reviewed, notably those of the LIFE+ programme.  | 43 
 
 
4.  KNOWLEDGE-BASED GOVERNANCE 
AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
urope´s future must be built on a knowledge-based economy. This 
was set out clearly in the Lisbon agenda and is once again confirmed 
in the Europe 2020 strategy and the Communication on the 
Innovation Union. In an ever more competitive world economy, 
continually evolving cutting-edge technologies and supreme skills in a 
variety of services are needed to secure high levels of employment and 
living standards on our continent. 
An important precondition for this is excellence in policy formulation 
and policy implementation. A knowledge-based economy requires 
knowledge-based governance, at both the national and regional levels and 
within the European Union. With the progressively increasing impact of 
our regulatory sphere, the quality of the EU machinery will achieve ever-
greater importance. European legislation is already decisive for our 
economic development and is bound to become even more so in the future. 
Growth is more dependent on EU rules than on EU expenditures. But 
some EU expenditures are instrumental in the formulation and 
implementation of EU rules. These deserve particular attention in the 
elaboration of the new MFF.  
The cognitive inputs required to provide momentum and sound 
directions for EU policy-making reach the EU institutions from many 
different sources. Research institutes, think tanks, interest groups, 
businesses, NGOs, national governments and regional bodies all make 
important contributions. It is vital that the EU institutions are well 
equipped to assemble, systematise and digest all these insights, proposals 
and criticisms. Much has been done in recent years to improve this process, 
particularly since the 2001 governance report. New methods for impact 
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assessment are evolving and the practice of consultations has reached 
impressive proportions. But the link between consultation responses and 
Commission proposals remains opaque. The new opportunities for better 
governance are hardly reflected in the Commission’s financial proposal. Its 
discussion on ‘administration’ boasts about cuts already undertaken and 
promises a further 5% reduction in the next period.44 The administrative 
programme put forward is based on such concepts as simplification, 
rationalisation and the introduction of single frameworks. An ‘equal pains’ 
approach suggests that EU institutions should be reduced in response to 
similar cuts in the member states.  
This is simplistic and at odds with other elements in the budget 
proposal. The idea of increased conditionality, for instance, is bound to fail 
unless the Commission can deploy sufficient resources to conduct its 
dialogue with national and regional governments and perform its own 
analysis of their initiatives. Today, several DGs and parts of DGs are 
already clearly under-equipped for this task. With the new proposals this 
capacity deficit will inevitably expand. 
EU legislation plays an increasing role in setting the framework 
conditions for European enterprises and private individuals. External 
policy analysis and diplomacy are vital to formulating European lines of 
action and to asserting European interests in the world. Cramming all these 
high-brow, highly qualified activities into the grey category of 
‘administration’ is to misrepresent and underestimate the crucial 
intellectual infrastructure of the EU.  
The traditional label of ‘administration’ is actually singularly ill 
chosen for the multitude of critical tasks carried out by the various 
segments and sections of the EU institutions. In common parlance this term 
conjures up the image of traditional paper-shoving bureaucrats, the tribe so 
well described by Balzac, Dickens, Gogol and other masters of European 
fiction. Under present conditions, however, it serves as a conceptual 
umbrella for a whole batch of indispensable functions: analysis, forecasting, 
statistics, implementation, auditing, monitoring, evaluation, impact 
assessment, deliberation, adjudication, stakeholder communication and the 
ramified activities of some 40 independent agencies. 
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A particular reason for the importance of these functions lies in the 
inevitable uncertainty inherent in much governance. Policy decisions are 
often made without full knowledge of the relevant causes and effects. This 
makes it all the more necessary to provide for adequate follow-up 
procedures and mechanisms for policy learning. Omissions in this sphere 
can be very costly, as evident from the current euro crisis.  
A further mistake is to make ‘simplification’ the principal avenue for 
the development of EU governance. Pushes in this direction may play some 
role but must always be balanced against conflicting interests. 
Accountability to the taxpayers requires regulatory safeguards. 
Sophisticated policy-making often relies on differentiation and avoidance 
of the one-size-fits-all recipe. ‘Red tape’ has a bad name but the formal 
requirements linked to obtaining EU funds also have many positive effects 
in administrative cultures traditionally characterised by favouritism, 
clientelism and cosy informality. 
It is also important to note that reducing the size of the EU’s 
administration may actually create more costs than cut them. For example, 
the European External Action Service has been left underdeveloped, but by 
pooling resources member states can actually save more than the costs of 
running all the external policy services independently.  
Strategies need to be evaluated in detail and reviewed not only by the 
Commission. The idea of having a peer review of the smart innovation 
strategies is positive, but this should also apply to other strategies for the 
structural funds. 
The quality of strategies depends on the quality of the people drafting 
them. In some areas there is a need for a more proactive relationship 
between the European Commission and national administrations, to 
increase the capacity of the regions and countries to better utilise the 
budget with a long-term growth perspective. 
This reinforced role of the Commission clashes with the financial cuts 
to administration. In countries where appropriate structures are missing, 
the European Commission should be able to participate at local level in 
solving the problems of the member states that seem unable to use the 
funding correctly. 
In conclusion, both the name and the size of the fifth heading of the 
Commission’s proposed budget (administration) deserve reconsideration. 
EU decision-making must be embedded in a continual pursuit of better 
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governance mechanisms and strong support for the institutional 
infrastructure of the EU are indispensable to strengthening the quality and 
impact of EU rules, not least those connected with the internal market.  
 
 
 
In a nutshell: 
•  The EU’s deepening integration and the number of 
responsibilities entrusted to the European Commission and 
its agencies require a knowledge-based, high quality 
administration. Presently this requires more investment – 
not cuts. 
•  In several areas, pooling the resources and having a central 
administration rather than 27 separate national ones is a 
savings measure. Cutting funding may result in more costs 
than benefits. 
•  The ‘administration’ heading in the budget does not reflect 
the work of the European Commission and the other 
institutions. The Commission should be an effective strategic 
and monitoring body. Weakening it will not have a positive 
net effect on the size and quality of the expenditures. 
•  The European Commission should be more active on the 
ground in countries unable to use the EU budget correctly. | 47 
 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
his report has emphasised that the EU budget is an important 
investment tool for long-term growth and fundamental for the 
functioning of the internal market. It is the principal financial 
instrument for joint action by member states to face common challenges and 
reach common objectives. The European Commission’s proposals reflect 
the need to approach the budget in this way and it has launched plans that 
do promote an investment vision for the budget, but they are insufficient to 
reach the goals identified. This report presents the areas that should be 
protected and advanced by the Council.  
The EU budget should be geared towards investing in long-term 
growth, the development of the internal market, financing key EU objectives and 
European public goods.  
For long-term growth the report argues that the focus on research and 
innovation has to be protected and reinforced. Cuts to the EU budget cannot be 
undertaken in areas that will undermine Europe’s capacity to compete 
globally and generate growth and jobs. No compromise can be acceptable 
in these areas. Funding for research and development under the Horizon 
2020 programme should be maintained at the level proposed or increased, 
bolstering the funding to such vital components as the Strategic Energy 
Technology Plan. 
This report recommends maintaining the proposed level of funding for the 
Connecting Europe Facility, but holds that the allocation of the funding 
should be reviewed. 
The future impact of the EU funds will depend on the quality of the 
strategies and their implementation. The  European Commission’s 
proposals on the governance of the cohesion policy should be supported. 
The requirements sought by the proposals in terms of strategies, which 
include smart specialisation strategies to be drafted by regional or national 
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authorities (or both) for the structural funds, should be endorsed. Yet better 
governance needs a stronger EU capacity to analyse, monitor and 
implement policies. The Commission’s proposals for cutting administration 
come at a time when demands call for the opposite. 
Without the so-called ‘innovative’ financial instruments, the EU will 
not be able to fulfil its objectives for the single market, innovation, energy 
or climate change. Thus a strengthening of the instruments is necessary, 
including the adoption of project bonds, which hold the potential promise 
of speeding up the completion of crucial infrastructure. However, these 
instruments should be used to make projects of high economic and 
European added value feasible, not bad projects attractive to investors. 
There is understandable pressure to rein in EU budget expenditures, 
but cuts should be found in areas where the European added value is low, 
not in areas that involve investing in the future innovative capacity of the 
EU.  
The EU budget should be an important tool to promote long-term 
sustainable growth in Europe. It is time that this is recognised and 
decisions are taken in line with ensuring it operates effectively and 
efficiently towards this goal. | 49 
REFERENCES 
Boulanger, P. H. (2011), Distribution of agricultural direct payments: the 
case of France, chapter 11 in OECD (2003), Disaggregated impact of 
CAP reforms, Paris 
Cipriani, G. (2010), The EU budget: Responsibility without accountability, CEPS 
Paperback, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels. 
European Commission (2009), Communication on Preparing for our 
Future: Developing a common strategy for key enabling technologies 
in the EU, COM(2009) 512 final, Brussels, 30 September. 
––––––––– (2010a), Communication on EUROPE 2020: A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020, Brussels. 
––––––––– (2010b), Review of the EU budget, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SEC(2010) 7000, Brussels. 
––––––––– (2010c), Interim Evaluation of the Seventh Framework Programme, 
Final Report of the Expert Group, Brussels, 12 November. 
––––––––– (2010d), Communication on the Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative – 
Innovation Union, COM(2010) 546 final, Brussels, 6 October. 
––––––––– (2010e), Communication on Energy 2020: A strategy for 
competitive, sustainable and secure energy, COM(2010) 639 final, 
Brussels, 10 November. 
––––––––– (2011a), Communication on a Budget for Europe 2020, 
COM(2011) 500 final, Part I, Brussels, 29 June. 
––––––––– (2011b), A Budget for Europe 2020: The current system of funding, 
the challenges ahead, the results of stakeholders consultation and different 
options on the main horizontal and sectoral issues, Commission Staff 
Working Paper, SEC(2011) 868 final, Brussels, 29 June. 
––––––––– (2011c), Proposal for a regulation on specific provisions concerning the 
European Regional Development Fund and the investment for growth and 
jobs goal and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006, COM(2011) 614 
final, Brussels, 6 October. 
––––––––– (2011d), Innovation Union Competitiveness Report, edition 2011, 
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Brussels. 
––––––––– (2011e), High-Level Expert Group on Key Enabling Technologies, 
Final Report, Brussels, 28 June.  50 | REFERENCES 
 
––––––––– (2011f), Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a 
competitive and resource efficient transport system, White Paper, 
COM(2011) 0144 final, Brussels, 28 March. 
––––––––– (2011g), Proposal for a regulation on guidelines for trans-European 
energy infrastructure and repealing Decision No. 1364/2006/E, 
COM(2011) 658 final, Brussels, 19 October. 
––––––––– (2011h), Communication on a Growth Package for Integrated 
European Infrastructures, COM(2011) 676, Brussels, 19 October. 
––––––––– (2011i), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council amending Decision No. 1639/2006/EC establishing a 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme (2007-2013) and Regulation 
(EC) No. 680/2007 laying down general rules for the granting of 
Community financial aid in the field of the trans-European transport and 
energy networks, COM(2011) 659, Brussels, 19 October. 
––––––––– (2011j), Communication on a Roadmap to a Resource Efficient 
Europe, COM(2011) 571 final, Brussels, 20 September. 
––––––––– (2011k), Proposal for a regulation on the European Social Fund and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2006, COM(2011) 607 final, Brussels, 
6 October. 
European Investment Bank (EIB) (2010), Evaluation of Activities under the 
Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), Operations Evaluation Unit, EIB, 
Luxembourg. 
European Parliament (2010), Reflection Paper on the Concept of European 
Added Value, SURE Committee, Rapporteur: Salvador Garriga 
Polledo, 21 September. 
High-Level Group on the Trans-European Networks (2003), High-Level 
Group on the Trans-European Networks, Report, 23 June. 
JRC-IPTS (2009), R&D Investments in the Priority Technologies of the European 
Strategic Energy Technology Plan, Report of the Institute for 
Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), a Joint Research Centre 
(JRC), Seville. 
Landabaso, M. (2011), “Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation and 
the New Structural Funds Regulations 2013-20”, Regional Innovation 
Monitor project, 27 October, presentation at the CEPS Task Force 
meeting on 6 December. 
Núñez Ferrer, J. (2008), The Evolution and Impact of EU Regional and Rural 
Policy, FAO–World Bank Working Paper, FAO, Rome, September. AN EU BUDGET FOR LONG-TERM GROWTH | 51 
 
Núñez Ferrer, J. and E. Kaditi (2007), The EU added value of agricultural 
expenditure – from market to multifunctionality – gathering criticism and 
success stories of the CAP, Study for the Policy Department on 
Budgetary Affairs, European Parliament, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, 12 December. 
Núñez Ferrer, J. and F. Figueira (2011), Achieving Europe’s R&D Objectives: 
Delivery tools and the role of the EU budget, Report No. 6, Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm. 
Nuñez Ferrer, J., C. Egenhofer and M. Alessi (2011), The SET-Plan: From 
Concept to Successful Implementation, CEPS Task Force Report, Centre 
for European Policy Studies, Brussels, May. 
OECD (2003), Farm Household Income, Issues and Policy Responses, 
OECD, Paris 
Reinstaller, A. and F. Unterlass (2011), “Comparing business R&D across 
countries over time: A decomposition exercise using data for the EU 
27”, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 19, No. 12, pp. 1143-1148. 
Tarschys, D. (2005), The Enigma of European Added Value: Setting Priorities for 
the European Union, SIEPS Report 2005:4, Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies, Stockholm. 
Uppenberg, K. (2009), R&D in Europe, Expenditures across Sectors, Regions 
and Firm Sizes, CEPS–EIB report, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels. 
 52 | 
APPENDIX 1. GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 
Bridge capital: In the case of RDI, this refers to financial support for the 
development of research results into a commercially viable product. 
Debt financing: A form of financial support that will cover the losses of lenders 
if a debtor defaults; it is similar to a loan guarantee, but debt financing is 
for ‘expected’ losses under normal conditions and thus equivalent to a 
subsidy. 
First-loss and second-loss risk: In structured finance, the losses on a transaction or 
a portfolio are distributed among various parties. Losses up to a defined 
limit will first be borne (by writing off capital, foregoing interest or 
otherwise) by a certain class. In the case of the Risk Sharing Financing 
Facility, the first loss is taken over by a €1 billion guarantee of the EU 
budget. Subsequent risk may be divided further, in this case second-loss 
risk beyond the €1 billion and up to €2 billion are taken over by the EIB. 
Grant: Non-refundable financial assistance. 
Economic rate of return (ERR): The ERR is similar to the internal rate of return, 
but incorporates the value of the social benefits of the project, which do 
not accrue to the promoter. 
Internal rate of return (IRR): This refers to the private economic returns of a 
project over its lifetime, minus net costs. 
Loan guarantee: Financial backing that protects the lender from losses incurred 
if the debtor defaults. 
Opportunity cost: The value forgone of the best alternative use of resources, i.e. 
the missed opportunity(ies) from any expenditure. 
Project bonds: In the project bond initiative, the project bonds are issued by the 
project company with the assistance and methodology used by the EIB. 
Project bonds themselves are not guaranteed by the EU or EIB. The EU 
budget and EIB only offer a risk guarantee to a maximum of 20% of the 
project, with the EU taking the first loss up to 10% and the EIB covering 
the remainder up to 20%. 
Risk-sharing: The EU has developed a number of risk-sharing facilities. These 
cover some of the financial risks of project promoters. Risk-sharing by 
the public sector reduces the capital costs of loans (or increases the value 
(reduces costs) of issuing private bonds), making projects viable.  | 53 
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